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Rennels v. Rennels, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 49 (August 4, 2011) 1
DOMESTIC RELATIONS – Termination of Non-Parental Visitation
Summary
Appeal from a court order granting Respondent’s motion to terminate grandparent
visitation with Respondent’s minor child.
Disposition
District court’s judgment reversed and remanded. Stipulated visitation orders are final
decrees entitled to res judicata protections. The parental presumption no longer controls once
visitation rights are judicially approved. To modify or terminate a visitation order, the moving
party must demonstrate changed circumstances affecting the child’s welfare and that
modification or termination is in the child’s best interest.
Factual and Procedural History
Respondent Roger Rennels (“Roger”) received sole custody of his daughter, Martina,
after divorcing her mother in 2001. Subsequently, Roger and Martina moved in with Roger’s
mother, appellant Audrey Rennels (“Audrey”). After a five month stay, Roger and Martina
moved to Texas. Audrey and Martina remained close and visited one another. In 2003, Roger
and Martina moved to Las Vegas. Thereafter, Roger married his current wife, Respondent
Jennifer Rennels (“Jennifer”). In 2006, Jennifer adopted Martina.
Appellant Audrey sought court-ordered non-parental visitation pursuant to NRS 125C.05,
claiming Roger stopped allowing Martina to see her in June 2004 because he disapproved of the
frequent contact. Respondent Roger opposed with a motion to dismiss. The district court denied
the motion to dismiss and required an evidentiary hearing because there was a rebuttable
presumption that granting non-parental visitation over a parent’s objection is not in the child’s
best interest.
Before the evidentiary hearing, the parties reached a settlement regarding visitation and
the court prepared a visitation order. The order allowed Audrey four supervised visits per year,
which would become unsupervised if a psychologist so determined. In 2008, a psychologist
recommended unsupervised visitation, but Roger refused. The district court denied Audrey’s
motion to compel Roger to comply with the order and granted Roger and Jennifer’s motion to
terminate visitation altogether.
Discussion
The Stipulated Visitation Order was Final
Public policy favors prompt and voluntary resolution of matters relating to minor
children. 2 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Nevada recognizes the preclusive effect of such
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agreements if deemed final. 3 An order is final when it fully resolves the presented issues and
leaves nothing for future consideration, regardless of what the order is actually called. 4 Final
judgments regarding non-parental visitation matters have preclusive effects on subsequent
litigation. 5
Here, the visitation order was final because the order resolved the visitation dispute,
memorialized the agreement, set forth the specific parameters for visitation, and provided for
modifications. There was no indication that the parties intended that the order be anything other
than a final judgment. Additionally, the order remained unchallenged for two years. Because
the order was final, it precludes re-litigation of Audrey’s right to visitation based on the same set
of facts already considered by the district court.
The Parental Presumption
The United States Supreme Court presumes fit parents act in their children’s best
interests. 6 As a result, fit parents’ wishes must accord at least some special weight with courts. 7
NRS 125C.050(4) also provides fit parental deference, stating that after a parent has “denied or
unreasonably restricted visits with the child, there is a rebuttable presumption that the right to
visitation . . . is not in the best interests of the child.” 8
However, when there is a court-ordered custody arrangement, the nonparent has
effectively rebutted the parental presumption. 9 The Supreme Court of Nevada extended this rule
to judicially approved nonparent visitation arrangements, stating the parental presumption does
not apply, giving deference to court orders, and promoting stability for children.10
The Ellis Test
The Ellis test was originally used for modifying custody arrangements, but the Supreme
Court of Nevada extended Ellis to also govern modifications and terminations of judicially
approved nonparent visitation rights. Under the Ellis test, modifications and terminations are
only warranted when 1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the
welfare of the child, and 2) the child’s best interest is served by the modification. 11 Courts
should evaluate both prongs without regard to parental preference.
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Prong One: Substantial Change in Circumstances Affecting the Welfare of the Child
The Supreme Court of Nevada did not address what circumstances are sufficient enough
to modify or terminate a nonparent’s visitation rights. However, some hostility between the
parent and nonparent is insufficient, especially since animosity exists when a party resorts to
litigation to settle visitation issues. 12
Here, neither parties nor the district court addressed changed circumstances before
terminating Audrey’s rights. Rather than make specific findings regarding changed
circumstances, the district court cited acrimony between the parties. Acrimony, by itself, is
insufficient to demonstrate changed circumstances.
Prong Two: The Best Interests of the Child
To evaluate whether a parent’s request to modify or terminate a nonparent’s judicially
approved visitation is in the best interest of the child, courts should consider the factors in NRS
125.480(4) and any other relevant considerations. The district court must consider custodial
stability in applying the factors.
Conclusion
The stipulated visitation order entered into by the parties was final because the order
resolved the visitation dispute, memorialized the agreement, set forth the specific parameters for
visitation, and provided for modifications. Furthermore, the district court failed to consider
Roger’s motion to terminate Audrey’s visitation rights in light of the Ellis factors. Consequently,
the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s order and remanded to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Meanwhile, the stipulated visitation
order remained in full force and effect.
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